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that i t  would certainly come within a definite short number of years. 
(This glorious Parousia was in fact held back only in the grace of God 
to allow the church to complete its mission and call all men everywhere 
to repentance and faith.) That the church is thus the eschatological 
community, already living in "the last days" and partaking of the 
blessings of the Eschaton through its commitment to Christ and its 
reception of the Spirit, and especially called to hasten that glorious 
appearing by its believing witness "till He come." All this leads to the 
declared conviction of the author that any weakening or abandonment 
of the Parousia hope can only result in "a real and extensive impover- 
ishment" of the church's life. 
I t  seems unfortunate that such a thorough study, supported by a 
bibliography of over 1000 titles, should end with a superficial criticism 
of the British Advent Awakening of the last century and of the Seventh- 
day Adventist Church of today, a criticism based upon the negative 
evaluation of a single secondary source in each case. This is the more 
to be regretted because Moore's criticism of these two movements 
does not lie in the area of his main thesis. Moore's criticism is based 
upon his present view of the nature and interpretation of apocalyptic, 
and its patent misapplication in the course of church history. Even in 
this area he is to be commended for his recognition that "apocalyptic 
properly begins with Daniel," and that apocalyptic shares its basic 
presuppositions with OT prophecy (p. I 8). But he appears not to have 
sufficiently recognized that there is a properly biblical apocalyptic 
and also an extra-biblical apocalyptic, and that though the second is 
based upon the first, the first deserves to be examined and evaluated 
separately, both in its relationships to 07: prophecy and in its bearing 
on the teachings of Christ and the early church concerning the Parousia. 
Newbold College, Brachell, Berkshire, England E. W. MARTER 
Ogden, Schubert M., The Reality of God and Other Essays. New York: 
Harper and Row, 1966. xii + 237 pp. $6.00. 
In this book there is presented to us a theology which claims to be 
secular, metaphysical and empirical. The problem with which this 
theology is occupied and which assumes a normative role is that of 
the relationship between the transcendence and the immanence of God, 
or that of his passivity and his relatedness to the world. The related- 
ness of God to the world is taken as a point of departure. So certain 
canons of theological importance emerge: in speaking of God one must 
begin with human experience; within human experience man's related- 
ness to his fellow is a given fact, hence God must be spoken of in terms 
of relationship. Indeed God is the eminently related one. 
Theology begins with the subject and generalizes the experience of 
subjects. This Ogden calls the "reformed subjectivist principle" (p. 57). 
By defining the self as relational we are led to a consideration of the 
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nature of relationship and so to process philosophy. By starting with the 
self we have available the existentialist analyses of selfhood, and so 
there opens up the possibility of a synthesis between existentialist 
and process philosophy. 
One may in this manner reappraise the starting point and the em- 
ployment of analogy in theology. By starting with the experience of 
being a self in relationship with other selves (since selfbood is experienced 
only in relationship), we may, by the analogza entis, speak of the concept 
of God's absoluteness as having ingredient within it the notion of 
relatedness. This is a "way of conceiving God's reality which is able 
to do justice to modern secularity" (p. 63) .  
A further theological concern is that of showing the cognitive status 
of theological statements. This requires nothing less than the adoption 
of a total metaphysic, within the terms of which particular assertions 
are shown to have significant meaning. What is required is a meta- 
physic that represents the common structure of existence. In this way 
the theologian can claim objectivity for his statements. 
Such a theologcal program, it is claimed, can more adequately justi- 
fy the meaning of faith than that which retains mythological elements 
while ostensibly seeking to demythologize. For human existence may 
be represented both in pkilosophical as well as mythological terms. 
The truth which myth represents can be h o w n  only as a process of 
translation into philosophical terms. I t  is Ogden's claim that process 
philosophy serves as the vehicle for such a translation which permits 
a cognitive evaluation of original content. The task of the appropriate 
translation of myth is to provide the "right" philosophy for the process 
of translation. 
The implications of this methodology for the doctrine of God are 
worked out in further essays in the book, where the author makes 
quite clear that it is not for the traditional understanding of God that 
he is an apologist. Ogden embraces the argument of Sartre that exis- 
tentialism is a humanism, and not antihumanistic (with its implication 
that there is no human nature since there is no God to  have a conception 
of it), as an expression of his own brand of theism, that of the eminently 
related God, that of pan-en-theism. While Sartre's argument is to be 
judged atheistic from the point of view of supernaturalism, it is 
to be seen as theistic from the viewpoint of God as eminently relative, 
to whom each of man's choices makes an enduring difference. 
That God acts in history means that he participates fully and com- 
pletely, directly and immediately, in the world of creatures. God's 
history is eminent history. Each creature is God's act. So the statement 
"God acts in history" is taken by Ogden as analogy rather than myth. 
Analogy represents God in non-objectifying existentials. So he can 
write that in his self-understanding man "represents not only his under- 
standing of God's action, but, through it, the reality of God's action 
itself . . . man's action actually is God's action" (p. 181). To say 
that God acts in history is to say that the transcendant action of God 
is represented in human deeds and words. In Jesus we are given a 
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transparent means of representing "a certain possibility for under- 
standing human existence" (p. I 86). 
The closing essay of the book attempts to demytholopze some of the 
traditional imagery employed in the service of eschatology. The 
mythological expressions concerning the end refer both to God and 
to man. Their meaning is to be found in terms both of "human pos- 
sibility" and also of "divine actuality" (p. 216). Man's end is in God, 
the eminently related one. Man's end is to be loved by the pure un- 
bounded love of God, and his prerogative is to accept God's love. The 
promise of faith is that God is man's end. "Our final destiny . . . 
is . . . to be loved by the pure unbounded love of God, for whom each 
of us makes a difference exactly commensurate to what he is and of 
everlasting significance" (p. 226). God is the all-encompassing one. 
Even hell is God's hell. 
Here we are presented with a radical existentializing of theology. 
All theological concepts have reference to man's present existence, in 
relationship with his fellows within the world. Man as an individual 
is set within the nexus of complex relationships, the totality of which 
is due for consideration by the theologian in the employment of the 
conception of "God." In Ogden's theology we have a juxtaposition of 
individual self-understanding, and the fortunes of the whole, the divine. 
This leads to a restriction of the concern with the individual to the 
present moment. Thus eschatological doctrine is concerned with the 
future of God, not that of the individuaI. Subjective survival is not 
an appropriate theme of such eschatology. The present is all-important. 
We reject this claim, and with it the suggestion for a theological di- 
rection which is based upon it. History is important, the resurrection 
is important as history, as having happenedness, as that which stands 
over against us from the past. A theory of knowledge or a theology 
which makes no room for the uniqueness of historical reality in the 
past, and allows of hope for the future is ipso facto disqualified by its 
failure to account for man's individuality, and for the uniqueness of 
historic occasions. Jesus' history is more than "simply" a means of rep- 
resenting a way of understanding human existence (p. 186). If not, 
we have gone the length of identifying theology with philosophy: the 
purported differentia of theological data become "simply" means for 
illustrating philosophical convictions. 
On such a reading one can cast one's theological net extremely wide. 
Having rejected traditional atheism as atheism by redefining theism, 
one can find theists among philosophers who in fact think themselves 
atheists. So Sartre becomes an apologist for a theistic understanding 
of existence, by having pointed out what he has in fact overlooked- 
a stage in the argument which renders him, on Ogden's definition, 
theistic. If God is actualized in the choices of men (cf, p. 176: that 
God is is necessary, but what God is is dependent in part upon the decision 
of the creatures in his world), and if the fact that there is moral truth 
implies the unconditioned meaningfulness of life, such confidence is 
made fully intelligible only in the idea of an eminently relative God, 
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intrinsically affected by those choices of man's freedom. Thus Sartre is 
brought under the wing of Christian theism. It must indeed be a 
permissive kind of theism that can make this move. 
While agreeing that too often attempts have been made to penetrate 
beyond the limitations of human finitude in dealing with the future, and 
that the task of theology is to speak of faith, and read theological syrn- 
bols in the light of faith, we dissent from the exclusive confining 
of theological symbol to the present existence. Indeed all eschatolog- 
ical symbol does represent an understanding of human existence. 
That existence is not in principle to be confined to the present. To 
do so would mean the removal of hope from Christian existence. Not 
enough attention has been given to this aspect of the question. I t  is 
only when exclusive attention is given to the present existence that 
it can be said that the question of survival is left "completely open" 
(p. 229). But the specificity with which one asks quite concrete 
questions about the meaning and expression of present existence, 
coupled with the fact that hope is endemic to man qua man, as is 
indicated by phenomenological studies, drives one to seek for quite 
specific answers to the problem of the future. The alternative would 
be to see in the resurrection of Jesus (to be taken seriously as a histor- 
ical datum) a clue to theological reason that embraces within it 
the concern for answering questions regarding the future of the individ- 
ual man. For such the statement that the question of the future 
individual is completely open is only one side of what needs to be said. 
Ogden appeals to the cognitive status of statements made within 
the context of a process philosophy which attempts to offer an explana- 
tion of the world on the grand scale. Naturally the Christian theologian 
is concerned that the statements he makes be both meaningful and 
true. All such statements are made within contexts, the exploration 
of which is necessary for the understanding of the statements. But; 
there is no single context which is determinative of meaningfulness for 
theological statements. Statements about faith, necessarily symbolic, 
are to be understood within the context which faith itself creates, 
either directly or more distantly, as in the process of translation of 
"mythical" statements into metaphysical statements. If we diffcren- 
tiate between primary and secondary contexts, we would indicate 
a philosophical expression of faith, in the grand scale of a metaphysic 
such as that of Whitehead as a secondary context. The exhibition of 
the cognitive status of theological statements can take place from within 
primary contexts, as well as from within secondary contexts. Ogden 
plumps for one such secondary context as the locus from which argu- 
ments for the cognitive status of theological statements can be made. 
We should not be led to think that this is the only possibility. 
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